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Abstract 
Even if we can generate a logical form, principles of use may  limit the ways in  which we can 
use it. In this paper, I motivate one such principle of use, and explore its effects. Much of the 
discussion  involves  kinds  of  sentences  that  have  received  attention  in  the  literature  on 
"individual-level predicates." 
1  A possible line of argumentation, and reasons to reject it 
Here  is  a  familiar  line  of  argumentation  similar  to one  advanced  by  Kratzer  1995. The 
argument starts from the idea that in the logical  form of a sentence containing an adverbial 
quantifier like always,  the quantifier bears an index. The logical form for a sentence like (la) 
on this approach is something like (lb). (And on this approach logical forms that conform to 
the  schema [,  [...alwaysl...]  p ] are interpreted roughly  as in (Ic).) The argument calls 
attention to the fact that, unlike sentences like those in (la), sentences like those in (2) sound 
bizarre. It points out that  we can explain why they sound bizarre if  we assume, along with 
some  other  assumptions,  that  their  possible  logical  forms  contain  no  item  that  can  be 
coindexed with the quantifier. It concludes on this basis that indeed (2) contains no item that 
can be coindexed with the quantifier. 
(1)  a.  Ingrid is always on the phone. 
b.  If: [,  [...alwaysl...] [p ... 1 ... Ingrid on the phone ... ] 
c.  [[  cx ]Ig (w) = 1 as long as for all time intervals t that satisfy in w the 
g l->r  contextually salient property of time intervals, [[ P 11  (w) = I. 
(2)  Ingrid was always Swedish. 
My hope in this paper is to defeat this line of argumentation. My thesis is that there are 
principles of grammar that (2) violates even if we analyze it as containing an item that can be 
coindexed with the quantifier. If this is correct, then just on the basis of the strangeness of (2), 
we have no evidence for the claim that its logical form lacks these additional indices (or for 
that matter for the assumptions that derive the bizarreness of  (2) given the lack of additional 
indices). Maybe there is evidence for something like this, but it doesn't come from sentences 
like (2). 
My main  goal  in  this paper  is to independently motivate  a principle  from which  it 
happens to follow that (2) sounds bizarre. I will demonstrate some of the consequences of this 
principle,  and I will  conclude by  suggesting that once we recognize this principle, we gain 
some  insight  into  the  question  of  what  interpretations  sound  natural  for  sentences  with 
indefinites. As far as this workshop is concerned, this paper should serve as a cautionary note. 
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(2) sound bizarre  and  what interpretations  sound natural  for sentences with indefinites, we 
should not use the same facts to motivate syntactic stipulations that do the same work. 
To see why I think that (2) incurs problems that should not be traced to the presence or 
absence of an item coindexed with the quantifier, consider the sentence in (3). 
(3)  The student who finished first was always Swedish 
Imagine  that  we  were  both  present  at  a  series of  exams, which  took  place from Monday 
through Saturday. We both saw that each time a different person finished first. In fact, the 
pattern was as in (4a): 
(4)  We both see: 
a.  date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
fastest student:  Max  Ingrid  Olof  Ingmar  lngvar  lngeborg 
You just  saw the students, you don't know who they were or what their nationalities were, 
and so I tell you  (3) to inform you  of their nationalities. There is nothing bizarre about (3) 
when  used  in  this  context. What  can  we  conclude  from  this?  If  the  absence  of  an  item 
coindexed with the quantifier would render the sentence bad, and in fact the sentence is good, 
we can conclude that the sentence admits a logical form containing an  item coindexed with 
the quantifier. 
Now  that  we  have  established that  (3)  admits  a  logical  form  containing  an  item 
coindexed with  the  quantifier,  imagine  a different  situation. Just  as before,  we  were both 
present at the exams, but this time the pattern is different: 
b.  date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
fastest student:  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid  Ingrid 
Since we were both there, we both saw that the same person finished first each time. Still, you 
don't know who it was or what her nationality was. In this context, I cannot use (3) to inform 
you of the student's nationality. It sounds bizarre. And, since we have already concluded that 
the sentence admits a logical form containing an item coindexed with the quantifier, it can't 
be that its bizarreness is due to the lack of such a logical form. 
I think that it is reasonable to expect that the same thing that renders (3) bizarre in this 
context renders (2) bizarre. That is why I think that (2) incurs problems that have nothing to 
do with the lack of an item that can be coindexed with the quantifier. 
A similar point can be made by considering sentences like (5). Unlike the sentence in 
(6), which sounds fine and therefore must contain an item coindexed with the quantifier, (5) 
sounds bizarre, at least on an initial reading and encountered in isolation. 
(5)  John always knows whether Ingrid is Swedish. 
(6)  John always knows whether Ingrid is on the phone. 
Now, when  it comes to the sentence in  (6), it can  be  argued not only that the quantifier is 
coindexed with another item, but more specifically that it is coindexed  with an item in the Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
matrix  clause. (I will  sketch how in  a moment.) On the assumption that the only syntactic 
difference between (5) and (6) is the embedded clause, this means that (5) too must contain an 
item in the matrix clause that always  can be coindexed with. So it can't be that the bizarreness 
of (5) is due to the lack of this kind of item. 
I think  that  it  is  reasonable  to  expect that  the same thing  that  renders  (5)  bizarre 
renders  (2) bizarre, and  so that  is another reason  for thinking that  (2) incurs problems that 
have nothing to do with the lack of an item that can be coindexed with the cluantifier.' 
The  argument  that  sentences  like  (6)  contain  an  indexed  item  in  the  matrix  is 
complicated but its rough outline is as follows. It assumes that the possible logical forms for 
(6) are as in (7b) 
(7)  a. John always knows whether Ingrid is on the phone 
b. [...alwaysi...] [p ...  John know whether ... [y  ]  ] 
where the embedded constituent y is the same kind of  constituent that you  get in the logical 
form of simpler sentences like Ingrid  is  always on the phone, a constituent that contains an 
index: 
(8)  a. Ingrid is always on the phone. 
b. [...alwaysi...] [y ...  i ...  Ingrid on the phone  ] 
On  the  basis  of  this,  it  argues  that  to  make the  right  predictions  about  the  semantics of 
sentences like (7a) and @a), the constituents P and y must be interpreted as follows: 
(9)  [[ p ]Ig = hw. if, in w, Ingrid is on the phone for the duration of g(i) 
then, in w, John for the duration of g(i) believes Ingrid 
to be on the phone; and 
if, in  w, Ingrid is not on the phone for the duration of g(i) 
then, in w, John for the duration of g(i) believes Ingrid 
not to be on the phone 
(abbreviated further: hw. in w, for the duration of g(i) John knows whether 
Ingrid is on the phone) 
(10)  [[ y ]Ig = hw. in w, Ingrid is on the phone for the duration of g(i) 
It  is important to  note here that, in  the semantics of  p,  g(i) plays a role in  determining the 
duration of John's beliefs. 
The argument then points out that, on certain ideas about semantic composition, to say 
that  the matrix clause in  (7b) does not contain an indexed item amounts to saying that the 
matrix clause material  behaves semantically like a function that, given the denotation that you 
get for y,  will yield the denotation that you  get for P.  That is, it will behave like a function 
that, for any arbitrary assignment g and index i such that g(i) yields a time interval, will take a 
proposition of the kind in (10) and give you a proposition of the kind in (9). 
2 See de Swart 1991 for arguments of a similar nature. 
115 (1 1)  The matrix clause material "behaves like" some function F with the characteristic that, 
for any time interval y, 
F( hw. in w, Ingrid is on the phone for the duration of y ) 
= hw. in w, for the duration of y John knows whether Ingrid is on the phone. 
But at this point problems arise. On the one hand, one can make a case that it is implausible to 
assume that the matrix clause behaves like this. On the other hand, assuming that the matrix 
clause behaves like this seems to make wrong predictions. Therefore, we do not want to say 
that the matrix clause in (7b) lacks an indexed item. 
The wrong predictions that the proposal in (1  1) makes are as follows. Parallel to the 
pair of sentences in (7) and (8), we have pairs of  sentences like those in (12a) and (13a), for 
which we would posit parallel logical forms: 
(12)  a. John always knows whether at 5pm on the following day Ingrid is on the phone. 
b. [...always  ;...  ] [p ... John know whether ... [6  ] ] 
(13)  a. At 5pm on the following day Ingrid is always on the phone. 
b. [...always;...] [s ...j ...  at Spm on the following day Ingrid on the phone  ] 
Given the way (13a) is interpreted, the right semantics for 6 seems to be: 
(14)  [[ 6 ]Ig  = hw. in w, Ingrid is on the phone at Spm on the day after g(i) 
Now by assumption to obtain [[ P ]Ig we apply the function F to [[ 6 I]?  So take an arbitrary 
assignment g and index j. What will F yield for the proposition in (14)? F will yield: 
(15)  [[ P ]Ig = F([[ 6 11'  ) = 
hw. in w, at 5pm on the day following g(i), John knows whether Ingrid is 
on the phone 
Glossing over some steps, the consequence will be that a sentence like (12a) should express 
that all relevant times are such that John knows one day later at 5pm whether Ingrid is on the 
phone. But it doesn't express that. It expresses that all relevant times are such that John knows 
then whether one duy later at 5pm Ingrid is on the phone. 
2  What is the generalization about when (3) (=(16))  can be used? 
I will now return to the sentence in (16), and attempt to describe the conditions under which it 
is infelicitous. On the basis of  this description, I will then propose a principle of pragmatics 
that determines when it is appropriate to use sentences of this kind. 
(16)  The student who finished first was always Swedish. 
The discussion in this section will rely on some assumptions that I will make about the logical 
forms available for sentences like (16) and about aspects of  the way these logical forms are 
interpreted. These assumptions are intentionally simplified, and in the rest of the paper I will 
take the simplifications for granted. I will hope that on different assumptions, the essence of Prafnlutic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Tenzporul) Quantification 
what  I  have  to  say  will  remain  even  though  the  details  will  have  to  be  different.  The 
assumptions are these: 
First, as far as the syntax of sentences like (16), I will be consistent with what I have 
been  assuming  until  now. I will  assume that  in the  lfs  of  these  sentences  all  items  have 
reconstructed to below the VP level, and I will be assuming that there is nothing interpretable 
above always, which is adjoined to VP, so that everything above always can be ignored. (This 
is a big simplification for one thing because it means that I am ignoring tense nodes, and thus 
tense information.) As before, I will assume that adverbial quantifiers like rrlways are indexed. 
The interpretable pieces of (16)'s If  are thus as in (17). 
When  it  comes to my assumptions about how  lfs like (17) are interpreted, I will be 
departing slightly from an idea that I alluded to earlier (in (Ic)). Earlier, I assumed that the 
context makes salient a property of time intervals, and that we use this property to determine 
the intervals that always quantifies over (informally speaking). Now, I will assume that the 
context makes salient a set of  time intervals, and that we interpret quantifiers like always as 
quantifying over the members of this set. Specifically, an If  like (17) will be interpreted as in 
(18). This simplification will strongly affect the terms of the coming discussion. 
(18)  [[ alwaysi 1,  I  ]Ig= 
hw. for all time intervals t in the contextually salient set S of time intervals, 
[[a]]gi-"(w)=  1. 
In general, interpretation will work in such a way that, when we compute the denotation of a 
sentence's If  with respect to an assignment, we will get a function from worlds to truth values. 
The way in  which these denotations fit into a theory of  the way truth judgments  depend on 
syntactic structures is the usual one: on this theory, when we say that a sentence is true, we 
are  saying that  we  can  find  an  if  for it  and  an  assignment  such that  the  actual  world  is 
characterized by the function we get by evaluating the if with respect to the assignment. 
Once we make assumptions like these, we can draw conclusions about other aspects of 
the semantics of  (16). Consider once again sentence (16) as uttered in  the first scenario, on 
which the student who finishes first is different each time. 
(19)  Exam date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
Fastest student:  a  b  c  d  e  f 
The fact is that, if  we know that the students who finished were all Swedish-born, we would 
say that the sentence is true. If  we assume that the If  of  (16) conforms to the format in (17), 
then  we might draw the following conclusions from this. First, the context makes salient a 
series of exam days ((20a)) -  specific time intervals during which the actual exams occurred. 
Second, in the If  of  (16), the denotation of the constituent that combines with always is as in 
(20b). 
(20)  a. S = { Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday ) b. [[ a ]Ig  = hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam 
held in g(1)  is Swedish-born in w. 
With this, we account for the fact that, if we think that the students who finished first were all 
Swedish, then we take the sentence to be true. (Reasoning: Take any assignment. Given (18) 
and (20), the function that we get by evaluating the If  of (16) with respect to that assignment 
will be as in (21) below. This function characterizes the actual world as long as on each exam 
day the first student to finish was Swedish. Now, by hypothesis, to say that (16) is true is to 
say that the actual world is characterized by a function that we get when we evaluate (16)'s If 
with respect to some assignment. So suppose that we think that the actual world is such that 
on each exam day the first student to finish was Swedish. Well, this amounts to saying that we 
think that the actual world is characterized by the function in (21). So given that the function 
in  (21) is a function that we get by evaluating (16)'s If  with respect to some assignment, we 
should take (I 6) to be true.) 
(21)  hw. For all days t in S, the individual who in w is the student first to finish the 
exam held in t is Swedish-born in w. 
(= [[ (17)  ]I9 for all g) 
In  what follows, I will assume that these are the right conclusions to draw. If these are 
the right conclusions to draw, then to say that (16) is true is to say that the function in  (21) 
characterizes the actual world. Equivalently, to say that (16) is true is to say that all of  the 
functions in Z characterize the actual world: 
(22)  f  hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on MONDAY is  Swedish-born in w.  1 
1  hw, the individual who in w is the student first to finish the enam held on TUESDAY is Swedish-born in  w.  1 
= {  hw, the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on WEDNESDAY is Swedish-born in w.  / 
1  hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on THURSDAY is Swedish-born in w.  I 
1  hw, the individual who in w is the student tint to finish the exam held on FRIDAY is Swedish-born in w.  1 
1  hw. the individual who in w is the student firsr to finish the enam held on SATURDAY is Swedish-born in w. 
Now.  here is the generalization that I am proposing specifically about when (16) can 
be used. This generalization makes reference to the function in (21). On the assumptions so 
far, (21) is the denotation of (16)'s If  with respect to any assignment, so on the assumptions so 
far the generalization makes reference to the denotation of (16)'s if. 
(23)  Proposed generalization about (16): 
The cases where (16) sounds strange are the cases where we could determine whether 
(21) holds of the actual world by determining whether the propositions in some proper 
subset of C  hold of the actual world. (And moreover -  as will be discussed below -- 
the smaller the subset, the worse (16) sounds.) 
Consider for example our second scenario, repeated in (24). 
(24)  Exam date:  M  T  W  Th  F  S 
Fastest student:  a  a  a  a  a  a 
We  were both present at all the exams, and I tell you (16) afterwards to inform you of 
a's nationality. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Temporal) Quastificution 
At the point when I utter this sentence, we are both aware that the student who finished first is 
the same for all t in S. That is, 
(25)  We are both aware that the actual world wO  has the following property: 
For all tl,  t2 in S, the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in tl 
is the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in t2. 
This  means  that,  to  determine  whether  (21)  holds  of the  actual  world,  it  is enough  to 
determine whether just one of the propositions in C, say (26), holds of the actual world. 
(26)  hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the 
exam held on TUESDAY is Swedish-born in w. 
(Suppose it does. Then 
(27)  the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held on Tuesday is 
Swedish-born in wO. 
And then from (25) -  omitting some steps -- it will follow that 
(28)  For all days t in S, the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held 
in  t is Swedish-born in wO. 
i.e. that (21) holds of the actual world. On the other hand, suppose it doesn't. Then 
(27')  the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held on Tuesday is 
NOT Swedish-born in wO. 
And then from (25) it will follow that 
(28')  For all days t in S, the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam held 
in t is NOT Swedish-born in wO. 
i.e. that (21) does not hold of the actual world.) 
Here, then, we can determine whether (21) holds of  the actual world by  considering just  a 
singleton subset of C. And the intuition is that (16) is very strange. 
I  think  that,  when  we  consider  variations  on  the  scenario  that  we  have  been 
considering, we find  that  the  strangeness  of  (16)  is  (inversely)  related  to  the  size of  the 
smallest subset of Z that can serve to verify (21). Imagine, for example, the variation in (29i), 
on which we see one student finishing first every day from Monday through Wednesday, and 
a different student finishing first every day from Thursday through Saturday. The intuition, I 
think, is that in this slightly altered scenario it is still quite strange to utter (16), but perhaps 
not quite as strange as in the scenario on which the same student finishes first each time. In 
this new  case, we can't determine whether (21) holds of the actual  world by considering a 
singleton subset of C,  but we can by considering a two-membered subset -  for example, {hw. 
the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on TUESDAY is Swedish- 
born in w, hw. the individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on FRIDAY is Swedish-born in  w}. When  we alter the scenario still further, so that  three students are 
involved ((29 iv)), (16) gets better still. And so on. 
(29) Other scenarios 
#propositions in Z that 
we need  lrl vcrify to knnw 
MTWThF  S  whcther 121 i  is true  Judrlnent 
i.a  a  a  b  b  h 
ii,  a  a  a  a  a  b 
iii.  a  a  a  h  a  a 
iv,a  ah  b  c  c 
".a  a  b  c  d  a 
two 
two 
two 
three 
four 
3  A constraint on the use of sentences with adverbial quantifiers 
One way of looking at these facts is as follows. A speaker who utters (16) in the scenarios that 
differ  from  our  first  scenario  (on  which  a  different  student  finished  first  each  time)  is 
quantifying  over  more  things  than  he  needs  to  in  order  to make  his  point.  In  using  the 
sentence in  (16), he is stating that all of the times in  one set have a certain character -  but he 
knows that we could have drawn this conclusion if he had informed us that all of the times in 
a smaller set had that character. Specifically, in  using the sentence in (16) he is stating that all 
members  of  (  Monday,  ..., Saturday  }  are  such  that  the  fastest  student  on  that  day  was 
Swedish. But he knows that we could have drawn this conclusion if he had informed us that 
all of the times in  a smaller set have this character. On our second scenario, one such smaller 
set is  { Tuesday 1. 
Conjecture: perhaps there is something wrong with quantifying over more things than 
you need to in order to make your point. 
I think that judgments of the sentence in (30) reinforce this impression. The judgments 
of (30) are parallel  to the judgments  of  (16). In the context of our first scenario, it seems a 
reasonable  sentence for the speaker to utter in order to communicate something (negative) 
about the nationalities  of  the fastest students. In  the context of  our second scenario, it does 
not. On a plausible analysis of  (30), a speaker who used it in this context would be claiming 
that none of the members of { Monday, . . ., Saturday }  are such that the fastest student on that 
day was Swedish. In  the case of the second scenario, however, the speaker is aware that, to 
get the addressee to draw this conclusion, he could confine himself to the claim that none of 
the members of a smaller set -  say { Tuesday ) -  have the relevant property. 
(30)  The student who finished first was never Swedish 
So I  will  follow  through  with  the  conjecture. I  propose,  roughly  speaking, that  a 
principle of pragmatics tells us not to use a sentence like (16) (or (30)) to quantify over the 
times in one set when we know that the hearer could draw the conclusion that the sentence is 
true by considering a parallel quantification over a smaller set. A sentence like (16) (or (30)) 
will sound funny if  we think that the speaker who used it violated that principle. 
To be more precise, the principle that  I have in  mind regulates the sentences that  a 
speaker can make use of by regulating the l$r  that he can make use of. Given my assumptions 
so far, it is natural to suppose that a speaker who asserts a sentence has in mind a particular If 
for the sentence (call  it L) and  a particular  assignment  (call  it  g),  and that his purpose  in 
uttering  the sentence is (among other things) to convey that  [[L]]%haracterizes  the actual Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Temporal) Quantification 
world. Let's assume this.'  The principle that I have in  mind narrows down what a speaker can 
hope to  convey  in  this  way  by  declaring  some lfs, on  some occasions,  off  limits.  Some 
sentences have only one If, some have more than  one. The principle will effectively ban  a 
speaker  from  asserting  a  sentence  if,  for example, the  sentence  has  only  one If,  and the 
principle blocks the use of this If. 
To talk about lfs, I will use the following (informal) terminology: 
First of all, consider again the way an If  with a1wuy.s gets interpreted. 
(31)  [[ always; [,  ]  ]Ie = 
hw. for all time intervals t in the contextually salient set of time intervals, 
[[  (w) = 1. 
Informally speaking, lfs of  the form [alwaysi a ] quantify over members of  the contextually 
salient  set  of  time  intervals.  We  might  express  this  by  calling  this  set  the  domain  of 
quantification for [[ alwaysi a ]Ix. 
For every If  of the form [alwaysi a ] and assignment g, we can imagine an alternative 
function that differs only with respect to what set is being quantified over. 
(32)  a. hw. for all time intervals t in set 01,  [[  a]lgi>'  (w) = 1. 
b. hw. for all time intervals t in set 02, [[  (w) = 1. 
c. hw. for all time intervals tin set 03, [[ a ]lei-" (w) = 1. 
.  .  . 
Let us call these functions domain-variants of [[ alwaysi a I]?  (32a) is a domain-variant of [[ 
alwaysi a ]IS with domain 01,  (32b) is a domain-variant of [[ always; a ]IS with domain 02, 
etc. Similarly, 01 is the domain for the domain-variant of [[ alwaysi a ]Ig given in (32a), etc. 
In  general, lfs of the form [QUANT; a ] -  where QUANT ; stands for an adverbial quantifier 
-- will behave analogously to lfs of the form [alwaysi a 1. That is, their denotations will be as 
in (33). Accordingly, we will be able to talk analogously about domain-variants of [[QUANT, 
allg. 
(33)  [[ QUANTi a  ]Ig  = 
hw. for proportion  6of the time intervals t in the contextually salient set of 
time intervals, 
[[a]~~~-''(w)  = 1. 
With this in mind, here is a stab at the principle that constrains a speaker's choice of If. 
It is a rule for speakers to follow: 
In general, when people talk about the readings that sentences have, they might be presupposing something like 
this.  One way of construing the claim that a sentence doesldoes not have a particular reading is as saying that a 
speaker canlcannot come up with a relevant If  and assignment that together yield a particular kind of function 
from worlds to truth values.  In Section 5, I too will talk about readings, I will assume that this is the right way 
of construing talk about readings, and moreover I will assume, together with a lot of literature, that people have 
intuitions about the readings that a sentence can havc. (P) Rule: 
(For any g), 
Do not use an ifof the,fom  [QUANT, a ] to express that [[QUANTi  allg 
holds of the actual world 
when you can find a domain-variant of [[QUANTi  allg,  A, with the following 
characteristics: 
i.  the domain for the domain-variant A is a proper subset of the domain for 
[[QUANTi  allg 
ii.  it follows from what the parties to conversation are taking for granted about 
the actual world that [[QUANT, allg  holds of the actual world as long as A 
holds of it.4 
On its own, of course, this principle does not explain why sentences sound strange. Over and 
above this, I assume that a hearer can reflect on whether the assertion of a sentence obeys (P) 
or not, and will find the sentence strange if it does. Specifically, I propose (Q) (both aspects of 
which hopefully derive from more general aspects of the way we judge sentences). 
(Q)  a.  A sentence whose only if is of the form [QUANT, a  ] will sound strange if 
we think that the use of this If  (together with any assignment) violates (P)." 
b.  If  we know that the speaker can find a A that has the relevant characteristics 
and that has only one element in its domain, then the sentence will sound 
terrible. Less terrible if two, etc. 
Now here is how principle (P) will apply to the use of (16) on our second scenario. By 
assumption, (16) has only one kind of If -  the one given in (17) -  and the denotation of this if 
with respect to an arbitrary assignment g is repeated in  (34a,b). (The denotation will be the 
same no matter what assignment the speaker chooses. In  what follows I will be sloppy and 
write [[ (17)  ]Ig  to  mean  this  one object that  is the denotation of  (17) with respect to any 
assignment. This might cause some confusion but I trust the reader to correct for it.) 
(34)  a. [[ (17) ]Ig = hw. For all days t in S,  the individual who in w is the student 
first to finish the exam held in t is Swedish-born in w. 
b. S = { Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday. Friday, Saturday ] 
One possible domain-variant A of [[ (17) ]Ig  is the one given in (35) 
(35)  One possible domain-variant: 
A = hw. For all days t in {Tuesday), the individual who in w is the student 
first to finish the exam held in t is Swedish-born in w. 
( = hw. The individual who in w is the student first to finish the exam held on 
Tuesday is Swedish-born in w. ) 
It so happens that the domain of A is ( Tuesday 1, which is a proper subset of the domain of 
4 Call C the set of worlds compatible with the information that the parties to conversation are taking for granted 
(cf. Stalnaker 1979). Then another way of putting (ii) is as follows: For every world w in C, [[QUANT,  a1lg(w) 
= l iffA(w)= I. 
'  More precisely: if, given what we think about what the speaker thinks is beinl: taken  ranted about the uctuul 
world,  it rollows that the speaker would violate (P) by using the relevanl If. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
[[ (17)  ]Ig .  What  this  means  given  (P)  is  that,  if  it  follows  from  what  the  parties  to 
conversation are taking for granted about the actual world that [[ (17) ]]"olds  of the actual 
world as long as A does, then the speaker is banned from using (17). 
Now, on  our  second scenario, this  does  plausibly  follow  from  what  the parties  to 
conversation  are  taking  for  granted.  The  important  aspect  of  this  scenario was  that  both 
parties to conversation were present at all the exams and saw that the same student finished 
first each time. This makes it likely that the following is being taken for granted: 
(36)  For all tl,  t2 in S,  the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in tl 
is the individual who in wO  is the student first to finish the exam in t2. 
But given (36), if  A(wO) = 1 we can conclude that [[ (17) ]IS(wO) = I  and if A(w0) is not 1 we 
can conclude that  [[ (17) ]Ig (wO)  is not  1. (We went through the relevant reasoning in the 
previous section.) In other words, given (36) we can conclude that [[ (17) ]IS  (wO) = 1 as long 
as A(w0) = 1. So -  assuming (36) is indeed being taken for granted -  (PI will prohibit the use 
of If  (17) on the second scenario. Moreover, since by assumption (17) is the only If  that the 
sentence in (16) has, (P) will effectively prohibit the use of the sentence in  (16). 
What will  be  the consequence? If  we think that  (36)  is being taken for granted (or 
more  precisely  that  the  speaker  thinks that  it  is), then  we  will  think  that  the  speaker  is 
violating (P) by using (16). Accordingly, the utterance of  (16) will sound strange. And given 
that the relevant domain-variant had only one element in its domain, the utterance of (16) will 
sound very strange. 
In what follows, in discussing examples like these, I will sometimes take an expository 
shortcut: I will draw a diagram that represents the knowledge of the world that the parties to 
conversation  are  taking  for  granted.  In  the  case  of  the  scenario  we  just  considered,  the 
diagram would look like this: 
a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first 
I will  only  be considering cases of  lfs whose  denotations are the  same with  respect  to  all 
assignments.  To show that  (P) blocks  a particular if, 1 will show that:  (i) if  we add to the 
diagram  the  information  that  a certain domain-variant  characterizes  the actual  world, then 
from  the  information  on  the  diagram  we  can  conclude  that  the  denotation  of  the  if 
characterizes the actual  world;  if  we add to the diagram the information  that  the domain- 
variant does not characterize the actual world, then from the information on the diagram we 
can conclude that the denotation of the If  does nut characterize the actual world. For example, 
if we add to the diagram the information that A characterizes the actual world a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first 
we have enough information in the diagram to conclude that [[ (17) ]Ig characterizes the actual 
world. If instead we add to the diagram the information that A does not characterize the actual 
world 
a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first  a is first 
a is not Swedish-born 
we have enough information in the diagram to conclude that [[ (17) ]]"oesn't  either. 
4  Some consequences of this constraint 
I will  now  demonstrate some of  the consequences  of  the pragmatic  constraint that I have 
identified.  I  am  going to  go through  a  number  of  sentences  which  have  lfs  of  the  form 
[QUANTi  a 1, and see what it predictions it makes about the felicity of these sentences. 
If  the approach that I have been taking is correct, then there are a number of  factors 
that play a role in determining the infelicity of a sentence with an If  of the form [QUANTi a]. 
One is the denotation of a,  because that will play a role in determining the denotation of the 
whole if  and therefore its possible domain variants. Another is the specific set of times that 
the context makes salient, because that is what functions as the domain of  [[QUANTi allg. 
Another is what we think is being taken for granted about the world, since this will play a role 
in  determining what we can conclude about the truth of the original sentence given the truth 
of a domain variant. So demonstrating the predictions that (P) makes will potentially require 
us  to take a stand on all  of  these factors. We will  see, however, that  in  a large number of 
cases, just  taking  a  position  on  one  or  two  of  these  factors  will  be  enough  to  make  a 
prediction. 
One remark in advance. In examining the predictions that we make once we take (P) 
into account, I am going to assume that apart from (P) there is an additional constraint on the 
use of quantifiers like always  and never: 
(39)  Only use [ QUANTi a ] if  (for some g) the domain of quantification fot 
[[ QUANTi a ]Ig contains more than three objects. 
This can be independently motivated, and should follow from more general restrictions on the 
use of  quantifiers (parallel restrictions apply to  every, etc.).  (Cf. de Hooplde Swart  1989.) 
Without going through the reasoning, I will just note that some evidence for (39) comes from 
judgments  of  our old sentence (16) (= (40a)) on some variants of  our first scenario. On a Pragmatic Consrraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
scenario where there are only two exam days instead of six ((40b)), the sentence sounds very 
odd. When there are three ((~OC)),  it still sounds odd (though less odd). When there are four 
((40d)), it doesn't sound bad at all. 
(40)  a. The student who finished first was always Swedish. 
h. M  T  ?'??  c.MT  W  '!  d. M  T  W  Th  nolhad 
a  h  a  hc  a  hc  d 
The first case that I will consider is the case of the sentence we started out with ((41a)). I will 
assume that the only ifs it has are of  the kind we have considered so far, one where always 
combines with another constituent ((41b)). 
(41)  a. Ingrid was always Swedish. 
b. If: alwaysi  .[  ... J 
What we assume to be the denotation of  this other constituent will obviously play a role in 
when we predict the If  in (41b), and thus the sentence in (41a), to be usable. I will assume the 
following  about the constituent  that  always attaches to."  will  assume that  the constituent 
contains an index but the only purpose of  this index is to restrict the domain of the function 
that we get out of this constituent. (This assumption isn't innocuous, and we will see that the 
contribution  of the index plays a role in our reasoning about when (41a) will be felicitous.) 
The denotation  of  this  constituent  with  respect  to  an  assignment  will  be  specifically as in 
(42b). 
(42)  a. alwaysi .[  ...  i  ] 
h. [[ a ]Ig = 
hw: Ingrid is alive in w for the duration of  g(i). Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. 
(cf. Musan 1995) 
The result is that the If  of (41a) will have a denotation as in (43), where S is the contextually 
salient set of time intervals, 
(43)  [[ (41b) ]]g (w) = 1 as long as for all t in S,  Ingrid is alive in w for the duration oft  and 
Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. 
and accordingly domain-variants of [[ (41b) ]Ig will be of the form 
A(w) = 1 as long as for all t in o,  Ingrid is alive in w for the duration oft 
and Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. 
Given this, we can derive (by making an additional  assumption) that, no matter what 
exactly the salient time intervals are, a speaker is not permitted  to utter (41a). This in turn 
means that a sentence like (41a) should always sound bizarre. Since it is hard to imagine an 
utterance of (41a) that sounds sensible, this prediction seems right. 
6 This can he seen as a minor change from what I have assumed so far in talking about The student whofinished 
first  was always Swedish, but it is not a change that affects the preceding discussion in any serious way. In  brief, the reasoning is as follows. Lfs of the kind  in (41b) are the only ones that 
(41a) admits, so if a speaker is prevented from using those he can't use (41a). Now, I assume 
that  an  independent principle  of grammar (I will  elaborate briefly below)  guarantees that a 
speaker is only allowed to use (41b) when it is already established that Ingrid is alive at all the 
intervals in the contextually salient set. But if it is already established that Ingrid is alive at all 
the intervals in the contextually salient set (and there is more than one interval in this set), a 
speaker who uses (41b) will  violate (P). To see this, imagine first the information that the 
parties to conversation are taking for granted: 
lngrid is  Ingrid is  lngrid is  lngrid is  Ingrid is 
alive  alive  alive  alive  alive 
Now consider the domain-variant of [[(41b)]Jg  whose domain consists only oft,, the first time 
interval in the contextually salient set. (Call it A again.) A characterizes a world w as long as 
for all t in { t, ), Ingrid is alive in w for the duration oft  and Ingrid is Swedish-born in w. That 
is, it characterizes a world w as long as Ingrid is alive in w for the duration of tl and Ingrid is 
Swedish-born  in  w. Suppose we add to the diagram the information that A characterizes the 
actual world. This amounts to adding: 
b.  Ingrid is Swedish-born 
and now from the information in the diagram we can conclude that [[(41b)]lg characterizes the 
actual world.  Suppose instead we add to the diagram that  A doesn't characterize the actual 
world. The only way of doing this consistently with the information already there is to add 
C  Ingrid is not Swedish-horn 
and from this we can conclude that [[(41b)]lg does not characterize the actual world. 
(How about if  there is only one interval in the contextually salient set? In this case, we 
will  not be  able to find a relevant  domain  variant  of  [[(41b)]Jg whose  domain is a proper 
subset of [[(41b)Jlg 's domain, so (P) will not be violated. But the principle in (39) will be, so 
even in this case the speaker will be prevented from using the If  in (41b).) 
The  independent  principle  of  grammar  that  I  made  use  of  in  the  course  of  my 
reasoning here is one that has been  identified in  discussions of  "presupposition  projection" 
(e.g. Heim 1983).~  Given the domain condition in the denotation of the sister of ulwa)ls ( the 
denotation given in  (42b)), this principle limits the conditions under which a speaker can use 
an  If  that  contains  this  constituent.  Specifically,  if  the  If  is  one  where  this  constituent 
combines with  a quantifier  (a quantifier  coindexed  with  the index  in  this constituent), the 
speaker can only use the If  when it is being taken for granted that a certain property holds of 
every item in the set the quantifier ranges over. Without going into detail, in this case, where 
7 One formulation that will do for the purposes here is: Do not use [ QUANTi a  ] to express that  [[ QUANTi 
a 11'  holds of wO  unless it is takcn for granted about wO  that, for every x in the domain of [[ QUANTi a ]Ig, 
[[ a ]IS  'L'"  (wO) is defined.  See Percus  1998 for a version of the principle that is very close to this one. Prujimatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Qurrntificatiun 
the quantifier ranges over time intervals, every one of these time intervals must be one during 
which Ingrid is alive. 
(45)  Consequence of one view of "presupposition projection"and  (42b): 
A speaker is entitled to use (41  b) to express that [[ (41  b) ]]%ools  of w0 only 
when (46) is taken for granted. 
(46)  For every t in the domain of quantification for [[ (41b) ]Ig, Ingrid is alive in 
w0 for the duration of  t. 
The next case I want to consider is (47). Here as before, I will assume that there is just one 
possible  kind  of  If,  one  in  which  always attaches  to  another  constituent,  and  that  this 
constituent is interpreted as in (48b). 
(47)  Napoleon was always dead 
b. [[ alls  = hw. Napoleon is dead in w for the duration of g(i). 
This means that the If  of  (47) will have a denotation as in (49), where S is the contextually 
salient set of time intervals. 
(49)  [[(48a)]lg = hw.  for all t in S, Napoleon is dead in w for the duration oft 
and accordingly domain-variants of [[(48a)]]bill be of the form  hw.  for all t in o,  Napoleon 
is dead in w for the duration oft. 
The fact is that, as with the previous sentence, it is hard to imagine an utterance of (47) 
that does not sound bizarre. My feeling is that when we try to imagine a speaker uttering the 
sentence, we have the impression that the speaker who utters it expects that at any moment 
Napoleon could have come back to life, as in "I kept checking the coffin, but Napoleon was 
always dead." That a speaker should expect something like this itself seems bizarre. 
What we can derive on these assumptions about the syntax and semantics of  (47) is 
that (47) will be unusable when it is taken for granted that anyone who is dead at one point is 
dead at all later points ((50)) -  again, irrespective of what exactly those time intervals are that 
the context makes salient. This is because, no matter what set of  intervals the context makes 
salient, a speaker who uses the If  in  (4%)  while (50) is taken for granted will  violate (P). 
Since lfs of the kind in  (48a) are the only ones that (47) admits, as long as (50) is taken for 
granted, a speaker will never be able to felicitously utter (47). 
(50)  Fact about the actual world wO: 
For all x, t, t', if x is dead in wO  at t and t' contains no moment that precedes t 
then x is dead in w0 at 1'. 
To see this, again imagine the information that is being taken for granted: (51)  a.  S = { t,, ....  t,) 
if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is  ifNis 
drad now,  drad now,  dead now,  dead now,  dend now. 
he is dend  he is dead  he is dead  he is dead  he is dsad 
181cr  too  laler too  later 100  lnler 100  Inter too 
Now consider the domain-variant (call it A again) whose domain consists only of tl, the first 
time interval  in  the contextually salient set. Suppose we add to the diagram the information 
that A characterizes the actual world: 
if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is 
dead now,  dsad now,  dend now,  dead now,  dead now 
IIC is devd  he is  dead  he is  devd  he is dead  heir  dead 
Inter loo  Inter too  later too  later too  later too 
N is dead 
new 
From this we can conclude that [[(48a)]lg characterizes the actual world. Suppose instead we 
add the information that A does not characterize the actual world: 
if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is  if N is 
dead now,  dend now,  devd now,  dead now,  dead now, 
he is dead  he is dead  he is dead  he is dead  he is dead 
later loo  Inter loo  later too  later too  later too 
N is not 
dead now 
From this we can conclude that [[(48a)]lg does not characterize the actual world 
Here as in  the previous case, the conclusion that (47) is unusable depends in part on 
the idea that the parties to conversation  are accepting certain  assumptions  about the world. 
The relevant assumption here is that once you  are dead, you're dead. Unlike in  the previous 
case, however, there is no principle that links the acceptance of this assumption to the fact that 
the speaker has decided to use (47). Therefore, we predict that in cases where it is clear that 
the parties  to  conversation  are not  making  this  assumption,  the  sentence  might  not  seem 
strange. Although we generally do accept that once you are dead, you're dead, stories about 
resurrection or about supernatural beings that come back to life suggest that one might choose 
not to accept this. Here is a case parallel to (47) in  which the speaker specifically disavows 
the assumption that once you are dead, you're dead. The relevant clause here does not sound 
so bizarre, so this at least is consistent with the story we have told. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Tempml)  Quarztification 
(52)  Vampires are supposed to come back to life after midnight, but I checked the 
coffin every half hour and I can assure you that this vampire was always dead. 
Here is a minimal pair that suggests that the story of the kind here is on the right track. 
It doesn't involve dead but rather tall and blue-eyed. A parallel  account of (53) would yield 
roughly the following: if the parties to conversation presume that once you are tall and blue- 
eyed, you are tall and blue-eyed for good, then (53) will lead to a violation of (P). This is the 
kind  of  assumption  that we might  normally make, but  not  in  a context where the speaker 
acknowledges the existence of supernatural forces, like witches'  spells, that can induce shape- 
changing. (55) is a case where the speaker acknowledges the existence of such forces; (54) is 
a case where he doesn't. My impression is indeed that in (54) but not in (55), the last sentence 
comes as  a bit  of  a surprise. It  seems to  suggest that  the medication  could  have changed 
John's height or eye color, and this is not what we nomlally expect medication to be able to 
do. 
(53)  John was always tall and blue-eyed, 
(54)  The experimenters gave them a new medication every Tuesday evening. The next 
morning, the two of them generally looked in the mirror to see if it had had any effect 
on them physically. Ingrid went through quite a variety of changes over the weeks, 
without much of a common denominator. One week she would find that she was more 
muscular, the next week she would find that she was a little wrinkly. John, on the 
other hand, was always tall and blue-eyed. 
(55)  The witch cast a spell on them every Tuesday evening. The next morning, the two of 
them generally looked in the mirror to see what changes she had made to their 
appearance. Ingrid went through quite a variety of changes over the weeks, without 
much of a common denominator. One week she would find that she was large and 
muscular, the next week she would find that she was frail and wrinkly. John, on the 
other hand, was always tall and blue-eyed. 
A variant of this case that is worth considering is the example in  (56) -  I assume that 
as before the only kind of If  that the sentence has looks like (57a), that the denotation of this if 
is  as in  (58)  and that  accordingly domain-variants  will  be  of  the form hw, for all  t  in  o, 
Napoleon is alive in w for the duration oft. 
(56)  Napoleon was always alive. 
(57)  a. alwaysi ,[  ... i ] 
b. [[ a]]G  kw. Napoleon is alive in w for the duration of g(i) 
(58)  [[(57a)]]"  hw. for all tin  S,  Napoleon is alive in  w for the duration oft 
Here we again derive that the sentence will be unusable when the speaker is taking for granted 
that anyone who is dead at one point is dead at all later points -- irrespective of what exactly 
those time  intervals  are  that  the  context makes  salient. However, this  example is slightly 
different from the earlier one. In the absence of accepted knowledge about whether Napoleon 
was born  yet  at the time  of  the first  interval, the kind  of  domain-variant  that  we need to 
consider  in  order to demonstrate a  (P)  violation  is  different  from  the kind  we  needed  to 
consider earlier. It is one with a larger domain. Specifically, its domain must consist of two intervals: the first interval and the last interval of the contextually salient set. (I leave it to the 
reader  to  verify  this.) Now, the  bizarreness  of  our  old  example (47) when judged  in  the 
absence of context suggests that in  the absence of context we seem by default to take it for 
granted that once you are dead you're dead. So, given the proposal thus far, one might expect 
that this sentence too will sound bizarre when judged  in the absence of context -  but perhaps 
a little less bizarre. That seems to be the prediction. 
In  the case of the sentences we just  looked at, anytime the parties to conversation are taking 
for granted the kind of assumptions that we all generally make about the world -  for instance, 
that once you're  dead you're dead -  the speaker will violate (P). And this is true irrespective 
of what set of time intervals it is that the context makes salient. Accordingly, as long as we 
have no reason  to think that  the  parties  to conversation  are  departing  from these normal 
assumptions,* we don't need to make any additional commitments as to what the salient set of 
time intervals is in order to reject the sentence as bizarre. At least, that is what follows from 
the picture I have presented so far. 
The case of (61) (= (5)) is different. (I will assume as before that (61) has just one kind 
of if -  given in (62a) -  and that the denotation of this lf is as in (63).) 
(61)  John always knows whether Ingrid is Swedish. 
(62)  a. alwaysi ,[  ... i ] 
b. [[ allg  = hw. in w, John knows for the duration of g(i) whether Ingrid is swedish9 
(63)  [[ (62a) 11"  kw.  for all t in S, in w John knows for the duration oft 
whether Ingrid is Swedish 
We would be able to say the same thing about (61) if we could maintain, for instance, that a 
normal assumption that we make about the world is that, once you know whether Ingrid is 
Swedish, you retain that knowledge forever. But I think that is not the kind of assumption that 
we normally make. We normally imagine that knowledge of this kind tends to fade, especially 
if you are never called upon to access it. In this case, if indeed the sentence sounds bizarre to 
us,  that must have something to do with assumptions we are making about the set of time 
intervals that is being quantified over. 
Here is the kind  of  situation in which  we predict that  a speaker who uses (61) will 
violate (P). We predict a violation of (P) when it is taken for granted that the distance between 
intervals is smaller than the amount of  time that it would typically take for John's memory to 
fade. The idea is this: suppose it is taken for granted that, ifJohn knows at interval t2  whether 
Ingrid is Swedish, then he knows this also at the succeeding interval t3. 
8 Or more precisely: as long as we have no reason to think that the speaker is assuming this kind of departure 
from normal assumptions. 
  ore precisely, to he consistent with the assumptions so far: Swedish-horn. Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
John's memory 
will no1 fade 
between now 
and the end of  13 
Then to determine whether he knows at all of  the intervals in S  whether Ingrid is Swedish, it 
is enough  to determine whether he  knows  at all  the intervals except  t3 whether Ingrid is 
Swedish. Consequently, we can show that the use of the if (62a) violates (P) by considering a 
domain variant of [[ (62a) ]Ig  whose domain consists of all the intervals except t3. 
What this means is that, to the extent that we feel that the sentence is bizarre when we 
have no clue as to what the relevant time intervals are, we must be making some additional 
assumption along these lines:  the distance between  intervals is smaller than  the amount it 
would take for John's memory to fade.''  On the approach that I have been taking, this is the 
conclusion we are led to. 
To test whether the approach is on the right track, what we should do is consider two 
kinds of scenarios, one where it is clearly taken for granted that the distance between intervals 
is smaller than  the amount of  time it takes for John's  memory to fade, and one where it is 
clearly taken for granted that it is larger. A sentence like (61) should seem odd in  the first 
scenario, but all right in the second. In fact, it is hard to think of any scenario where the kind 
of information that (61) conveys might be of interest, but the contrast between the following 
two dialogues might bear out the prediction. I think that the final sentence of the first dialogue 
sounds a lot worse than the final sentence of the second dialogue (where a natural paraphrase 
would  use  "remember"  instead  of  "know").  When  we  hear  the  first  dialogue,  our  first 
impression  is  that  "always"  is just  redundant.  If  we  try  to justify  it  to  ourselves,  then  if 
anything we  have the strange feeling that the  speaker thinks  that  the relevant  information 
might suddenly vanish from John's  mind, and when  we know nothing else about John this 
comes as a surprise. 
(65) -- I heard that Ingrid is Scandinavian, and I wanted to know whether she is Swedish. 
--  For some reason this question comes up a lot. I always send people to John to find out. 
He isn't very knowledgeable, it's true, but he does always know whether Ingrid is 
Swedish. 
(66) -- I heard that Ingrid is Scandinavian, and I wanted to know whether she is Swedish. 
--  For some reason this question comes up a lot. I always send people to John to find out. 
He has a lousy memory for many things, but he does always know whether Ingrid is 
Swedish. 
(A more realistic minimal pair might be as in (67)-(68), which I think behave similarly.) 
(67) -- I was advised to buy a box of Fenistil, but I need to know first whether it contains 
antihistamines. 
'O  Or more precisely: that the speaker is taking this for granted 
131 --  For some reason this question comes up a lot. Why don't you go ask the assistant 
pharmacist? He isn't very knowledgeable, it's true, but he does always know whether 
Fenistil contains antihistamines. 
(68) -- I was advised to buy a box of Fenistil, but I need to know first whether it contains 
antihistamines. 
--  For some reason this question comes up a lot. Why don't you go ask the assistant 
pharmacist? He has a lousy memory, it's true, but he does always know whether 
Fenistil contains antihistamines. 
5  Consequences for "semantic partition" 
Here is  a very  general pattern  of  reasoning. It  starts from the claim  that  we do not  use a 
sentence S to express the proposition that would be derived from an If  L."  It concludes on 
this basis that L is not a possible If  for a sentence S. 
Now that we have seen that principles of pragmatics can prevent us from using an If, 
we can see that this kind of reasoning is questionable. If we do not use a sentence to express 
the proposition  that would  be derived from an If  L, that could be because other principles 
prevent  us  from using L.  It  doesn't  have to be  because our mechanism  for generating  lfs 
prevents us from generating L for the sentence in question. 
One  place  where  this  questionable  pattern  of  reasoning  has  been  used  is  in  the 
treatment  of  sentences like Ingrid  was alwaq~s  Swedish. We saw that  there an independent 
principle  of  pragmatics, (P), could explain  why we do not  use an  If  that  contains an item 
coindexed  with  the  quantifier. I  want  now  to  look  at another case  where  this  pattern  of 
reasoning has been  used, and ask if  instead of  saying that the sentence lacks an  If  that  we 
might otherwise expect, we can again say that while in principle we can generate this If, in 
practice (P) will typically prevent us from using it. 
The sentences that I am interested in are sentences with "individual-level predicates," 
and I am interested in the way they behave with respect to "semantic  partition."  Discussions 
of the syntax and semantics of  sentences with singular indefinite subjects often start with the 
idea that sentences like (69) have among their possible lfs one that gives rise to a proposition 
like (70). They propose what that If  is and then argue that the parallel  If  is not available for 
sentences like (71). 
(69)  A secretary is always on the phone, 
(70)  hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who in w is a secretary for the duration oft 
and who in w is on the phone for the duration oft 
(71)  A secretary is always Swedish. 
The argument follows the pattern of reasoning that I just  sketched: We do not use a sentence 
like this to express the proposition that we would derive from the relevant if. Therefore, the 
sentence does not have the relevant If. 
"  I am using proposition here to mean a function from worlds to truth values.  I am using express proposition p 
to mean "convey that p characterizes the actual world."  See Section 3. 
132 Pragn~atic  Constraints on (Adverbial) (Temporal)  Quantification 
The kind of ifs that we are interested in  are lfs like those in  (72) and (73), or minor 
variants of these. 
(72)  always,  [VP [DP a2  secretary el ] [tz on the phone el ]  ] 
(73)  always1  [VP [OP  a2 secretary el ] [tz  Swedish el  ]  ] 
I have sketched in (74)-(76) a few aspects of  the way these lfs are interpreted. Some things 
that are worth  noting are that the indexed e items are silent items that function as variables 
over times, and that the DP functions as a quantificational expression with existential force. 
(74)  [[  [  [DP ai  secretary e, ]  a ]  ]IS 
= hw. there is some individual x 
such that, in w, x is a secretary for the duration of g(j) 
and such that [[ a ]lg  i~'  (w) = I. 
(75)  [[  VP(72)  ]Ig = hw. there is some individual x 
such that, in w, x is a secretary for the duration of g(1) 
and such that, in w, x is on the phone for the duration of g(l) 
(76)  [[ VP(77)  ]Ig = hw. there is some individual x 
such that, in w, x is a secretary for the duration of g(1) 
and such that x is Swedish-born in w 
The propositions that we would get out of these lfs are what I have written  in  (77) and (78). 
The If  in (72) would say that we can find a secretary on the phone at each of the contextually 
salient time intervals; the parallel if in (73) would say that we can find a Swedish secretary at 
each of the contextually salient time intervals. The position I am examining has it that, while 
we can generate the if in (72) for the sentence A secretary is always on the phone, we cannot 
generate the parallel if in (73) for the sentence A secretary is always Swedish. Is this position 
justified? 
(77)  [[ (72) ]Ig = 
hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who in w is a secretary for the duration oft 
and who in w is on the phone for the duration oft 
(78)  [[ (73) ]Ig = 
hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who in w is a secretary for the duration oft 
and who is Swedish-born in w 
The point that I want to make is that, even if A secretary is always Swedish does have 
the If  in (73), the use of this If  will be very restricted. As long as we take it for granted that at 
two of the contextually salient time intervals exactly the same people are secretaries, (P) will 
prevent us from using it. Suppose for instance that it is accepted that the pool of secretaries is 
the same from, say, t2 to the end of tS; then  (P) will  prevent a speaker from using (73) by 
virtue of the domain-variant whose domain simply excludes t3. This is because, to determine 
whether  there is  a Swedish-born  secretary at each of  the relevant  intervals, it is enough to determine whether there is a Swedish-born secretary at every interval but t3. (By contrast, to 
determine whether there  is  a Swedish-born  secretary on the phone  at each of  the relevant 
intervals,  it  is  not enough to  determine  whether  there  is a  Swedish-born  secretary on  the 
phone at every interval but t3. So (P) will not prevent a speaker from using (72) in the same 
situation.) 
(79)  contextually salient set: (  tl, ..  ., tS] 
the pool of 
secretaries is 
the same from 
here to the cnd 
of r, 
In  fact, if  the contextually salient time intervals are close together, it is pretty reasonable to 
imagine that the pool of secretaries will stay the same from one time interval to the next. 
What does this mean? It means that, to the extent that we do not naturally take the 
sentence to express the proposition  in  (78) in  the absence of  information about the relevant 
time  intervals, this might  not  be because the sentence lacks the If  in  (73). It  could just  be 
because,  in  the  absence  of  contrary  information,  we  tend  to  imagine  that  the  pool  of 
secretaries  will  stay  the  same from one interval  to  the  next - maybe because  we tend  to 
imagine  that  the  intervals  are close  together.  This  kind  of  default  assumption  would  be 
analogous to the  kind  of  default  assumption  we  considered  at the end of  the last section: 
namely that, in  the absence of contrary information, we imagine that knowledge of  whether 
Ingrid is Swedish will stay present from one interval to the next. If  we really want to know 
whether the If  in (73) is a possible one, we should at least make sure to look at cases where it 
is clear that changes in the secretary pool occur between the contextually salient intervals, and 
cases like these will have to have intervals that are fairly far apart. A candidate case is (80). 
(To judge by the nods at the workshop,) it seems that (80) can convey that every change of 
office staff results in the inclusion of a Swede in the secretary pool, and this suggests that the 
If  in (73) is possible.'2. " 
I2 I think that there is an additional aspect of (SO) that contributes to bringing out the reading I am interested in. 
This is the contrast between secretary and technical assistant.  (On the natural way of pronouncing (SO), there is 
pitch accent on both technical and secretary.) A near minimal pair (for me) that suggests that the contrast makes 
a difference is (i).  The continuation in (a) is bizarre, suggesting that none of its possible lfs is appropriate.  By 
contrast, the continuation in (h) is good and conveys that most staff reviews turn up a Swedish secretary. 
(i) We require them to hire Swedes for as many positions as possible.  With this in mind, we review 
their staff every year.  In fact, 
a. ?I a secretary is usually Swedish. 
h. none of the technical assistants are ever Swedish.  Still, a SEcretary usually is. 
Significantly, I think, for the analysis of this contrast, replacing "a secretary" in (i a) by  "one of the secretaries" 
redeems the sentence. 
13 One might imagine that the lfs for sentences like Some secretary is always Swedish or At least one of the 
secretaries is always Swedish yield propositions just like the one (73) yields.  Suppose they do. I have suggested 
here that, in the case of  (73), assumptions that we make in the ahsence of contrary information prevent us from 
using lfs like (73).  Does this imply that these other sentences should sound odd in the absence of special 
information'? The prediction here depends on other factors.  When we are exposed to a sentence and find that (P) 
taken together with our natural assumptions rules out one of its lfs, we have various options other than rejecting 
the sentence.  If the sentence has another If  that yields a different proposition, and that does not violate (P), we 
could decide to maintain our natural assumptions and to take the sentence as expressing that different 
proposition.  Or we could decide to revise our assumptions.  (In the case of sentences like (71), it has been Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial) (Ten~porul)  Quantification 
(80)  Every five years, we change office staff entirely. We never wind up with any 
Scandinavians as technical assistants, but by sheer chance a secretary is always 
Swedish. 
If  this line of  reasoning is right, there are still some questions to ask. But they have 
nothing to do with the lfs that (71) admits. The main question is why, when we ask ourselves 
whether it gives rise to the reading in (78), we have a strong tendency to  imagine that the 
times being quantified over are close together rather than far apart. We seem not to exhibit 
this tendency, for example, when we ask ourselves what a sentence like (81) expresses. Here, 
we seem to imagine that there is only one relevant time interval per reign." 
(81)  A blond is always King of Sweden, and a brunette is always Queen. 
I want to close this section by mentioning a prediction that we can now make. I just 
said with regard to sentences like (71) that, when we have to guess what kind of time intervals 
might be under consideration, unless we know otherwise, we apparently do not imagine that 
changes in the secretary pool occur between  the intervals. That is the conclusion we have to 
draw if (71) allows the If  in (73). As we saw earlier, we can draw a parallel conclusion from 
the fact that a sentence like John always knows whether Ingrid  is Swedish sounds bizarre in 
the absence of information about the time intervals under consideration. The conclusion there 
is that, unless we know  otherwise, we apparently do not imagine that changes in  a person's 
knowledge as to whether Ingrid is Swedish can occur between the intervals. 
When we put these two conclusions together with what we have said so far, we make a 
prediction. Consider the sentences in (82a) and (83a), which in some sense are parallel to the 
sentences we started out with in this section. On assumptions that can be reconstructed easily 
enough from the discussion thus far, one possible If  for (82a) -  abbreviated in (83b) -  yields 
the proposition  in (82c), and similarly one possible If  for (83a) -  abbreviated in (83b) -  yields 
the proposition in (83c). The If  for (82a) says that, at each of the relevant time intervals, there 
is some secretary who knows at the time whether Ingrid is Swedish. The If  for (83a) says that, 
at each of the relevant time intervals, there is some secretary who knows at the time whether 
Ingrid is on the phone (at the time). 
(82)  a. A secretary always knows whether Ingrid is Swedish. 
b. always,  [vp  [DP a2  secretary el ] [t2 knows whether In. is Sw. el ]  ] 
c. hw. For all intervals tin  the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who, in w, 
is a secretary for the duration oft 
and knows for the duration oft  whether Ingrid is Swedish 
(83)  a. A secretary always knows whether Ingrid is on the phone. 
b. always!  [vp  [~p  a2  secretary el ] [tz knows whether In. is on the ph. el ]  1 
c. hw. For all intervals t in the set of intervals that the context makes salient, 
there is some individual who, in w, 
is a secretary for the duration oft 
argued that another kind of If  is available, and so the first course is open.  In the case of sentences like Some 
secretav  ..., perhaps this option is not available.) 
l4 Parallel sentences with quantifiers like halfthe  rime might he of use in verifying this claim 
135 and knows for the duration oft  whether Ingrid is on the phone 
The prediction  is  this:  in  the  absence  of  information  about  what  time  intervals  are under 
consideration, it will not be natural to take (82a) to express the proposition that derives from 
that first If; by contrast, it should be natural to take (83a) to express the parallel proposition 
that derives from the second If. In  other words, the "semantic  partition"  difference that we 
find between A secretary is always Swedish and A secretary is always on the phone should be 
preserved across this kind of attitude context. (Why do we make this prediction? Because, if 
at one time interval we can find a secretary who knows whether Ingrid is Swedish, then we 
should also be able to find such a secretary at another time interval -the  very same secretary. 
So the relevant if for (82a) will violate (P). But if at one time interval we can find a secretary 
who knows  whether  Ingrid is on the phone, there is no guarantee that  we can find such a 
secretary  at  another time  interval.  So the  relevant  If  for (83a)  will  not  violate  (P).) This 
prediction  seems to me to be correct. This is of  interest because, contrary to what is often 
claimed, the ability to use lfs like those in  (82b)-(83b) apparently does not depend on the 
identity of  the matrix verb: the matrix  verb is the same (know) in  both lfs, but it looks as 
though the first If  is usable while the second is not. 
6  Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I have argued for a conception of  grammar under which principles of use may 
prevent us from availing ourselves of  representations that we nonetheless have the resources 
to generate. I pointed out specifically that, since principles of use may sometimes block the 
use of lfs, we have to be careful when arguing that a sentence does not admit such and such an 
If. 
I tried to motivate a particular principle of use, (P), and my concern was to explore its 
effects. The questions that arise are the usual ones. Are there alternative lines of explanation 
that would have accounted for the same facts that I used (P) to account for? If indeed a theory 
that incorporates a principle like (P) is on the right track, is the relevant principle really (P), or 
is there a better way of formulating it? Does the principle follow from anything? Does it relate 
in any way to other principles of grammar that we know about? 
To motivate (P), I used the fact that the sentence The student who  finishedfirst  was 
always Swedish is unsuited to communicate the nationality of a certain student of whom it is 
known that she finished first each time. What other lines of explanation might one pursue to 
account for this fact? On the one hand, one might conjecture that the semantics of  sentences 
like  these  is  not  what  I  claimed,  and  that  the  sentence's  interpretation  alone  renders  it 
incompatible  with  the  situation  in  question.  On  the  other  hand,  one  might  attribute  the 
responsibility for this fact to other principles of use. One position to take, for example, is that 
it follows as a quantity implicature from the use of the sentence that the same student did not 
finish first each time. I can't address all the different options, but I am  skeptical of  this last 
position. To take this position is in part to say that we have a systematic way of  generating 
alternatives  to  sentences  like  the  one at  issue,  and  that  in  the  case of  this  sentence,  the 
procedure will yield a sentence that is logically stronger and that entails that the same student 
did finish first every time. (One such alternative sentence might be: The student who always 
finished  first  was (always) Swedish.) I am  skeptical  because I do not see exactly how this 
procedure for generating alternatives would work. 
Assuming something like (P) is on the right track, is the formulation of the principle in 
need of  refinement? Probably. For one thing, some provision  has to be made somewhere for 
the communicative intentions of the speaker: while in the scenario considered it is odd to utter Pragmatic Constraints on (Adverbial)  (Temporal) Quantification 
The student who finished first  was always Swedish in  order to  communicate the student's 
nationality, it is not so odd to utter the sentence in  order to communicate a simple statistical 
generalization. Maybe a better formulation of the principle would reflect this. Apart from this, 
I think there is a further inadequacy with (P) and (Q) as they stand now. They predict that 
sentences of the kind in (84) should have the same status, when my intuition is that (84b) is 
less bizarre  than  (84a). (While I haven't  come up  with  a context  in  which  (84b) sounds 
perfect, my impression is that it evokes the kind of  scenario in which someone checks every 
so often to see whether Napoleon  has died.) They predict that the two sentences should have 
the same status because, in both cases, one can determine the sentence's truth by determining 
the truth of  a domain-variant whose domain consists of a single time interval -  in the case of 
(84a), the relevant time interval is the earliest one in  the contextually salient set, and in  the 
case of (84b) it is the last one. Accounting for the difference between (84a) and (84b) would 
certainly mean revising (P), perhaps  in such a way as to take into account the chronological 
order (or some other natural ordering) of the time intervals in the domain of quantification.'' 
(84)  a. Napoleon was always dead. 
b. Napoleon was never dead. 
There is another potential  refinement worth mentioning: since my concern in  this paper has 
been exclusively with  adverbial quantifiers, I have formulated (P) to account only for facts 
involving adverbial quantifiers,  but naturally (P) should be extended to cover parallel  facts 
involving quantifier phrases in other positions. If I tell you (85) alluding to the Marx Brothers, 
that sounds as odd as telling you The student who  finished,first was always Swedish when we 
know that the same student finished first each time. Presumably it sounds odd for the same 
reason. 
(85)  Each one's mother was named Minnie. 
Is  there  any  connection  between  the principle  of  use  that  I  have  argued  for,  and 
anything  else  that  we  know  about?  As  a pragmatic  principle,  (P)  looks  very  different  in 
character from certain others that have been posited, in that it compares propositions that are 
equally informative. Perhaps it could be viewed as a subcase of  Grice's Maxim of Manner 
("Be  brief.")  (Its effect is radically different from the effect of the Maxim of Quantity, since, 
of  the propositions it compares, it instructs the speaker to reject the logically stronger ones.) 
As for the facts that (P) is designed to account for, there do seem to be facts that bear  a 
surface  similarity:  the  bizarreness  of  sentences  like  those  in  (86)  is  reminiscent  of  the 
bizarreness of the familiar sentences in (87). 
(86)  a. ?? At that time, Ingrid was Swedish. 
b # On Tuesday, the student who finished first was Swedish 
(given our second scenario) 
IS There are many candidates to think about. Here is an example (whose predictions I havcn't thought about). 
Starting from a salient (strong) lincar ordering of the intervals in the domain of quantification of [[ QUANTi 
a 115  establish a corresponding ordering of those domain-variants whose domain consists exclusively of a single 
element of that set. (For instance, if the domain of (84a) is {March 1810, April  18 10, May  1 810,  ...), order kw. 
in w Napoleon was deadfor the duration of March 1810 before dw. in w Napoleon was dead for  the duration of 
April 1810 before kw. in w Napoleon was dead for  the duration ofMay 1810, etc.)  New principle: Don't use 
[[ QUANTi  cc ]IS if the truth of one of these domain-variants guarantees the truth of the next domain-variant in 
the order. (87)  a. ?? Ingrid was always Swedish. 
b. #The student who finished first was always Swedish. 
(given our second scenario) 
(P) does not account for the bizarreness of the sentences in  (86). Since it is tempting to think 
that the problems with (87) can be reduced to the problems with (86), superficial similarities 
like these might  lead one to pursue an  approach  very  different from the one I have taken 
here.I6.  l7 
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